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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Torts-Speed Exemption Statute-Standard of Care in Operation
of Police Vehicles-Liability of City, County, or State for Negligence
of Police Officers.
The North Carolina speed exemption statute1 provides:
The speed limitations ... shall not apply to vehicles when
operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the
police in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or
of persons ... suspected of any such violation .... This exemp-
tion shall not, however, protect the driver of any such vehicle
from the consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of
others.
In Goddard v. Williams2 the court applied this statute and con-
sidered its effect upon the standard of care required of police officers
in the performance of their official duties. The plaintiff brought an
action against a deputy sheriff to recover for injuries sustained in a
collision between the plaintiff's automobile and the officer's patrol ve-
hicle. The plaintiff was proceeding down a city street at night and
began to make a left turn into a driveway. The defendant, in his patrol
vehicle, approached from the plaintiff's rear at a speed of seventy miles
per hour and struck the plaintiff's vehicle on the left side.
The officer testified that he was driving seventy miles per hour when
he was within twenty-five feet of the point of collision. He alleged in
the answer, however, that at the time of the accident he was pursuing
the plaintiff for failure to obey a stop sign and that the patrol vehicle's
siren and red light were in operation. He filed a counterclaim alleging
that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1953). This statute also applies to fire depart-
ment vehicles, ambulances and the vehicles of the Utilities Commission provided
they are on official business. The seemingly conflicting provisions of "due regard
for safety" and "reckless disregard of the safety of others" contained in speed
exemption statutes have caused confusion in determining the standard of care
required of police officers. In construing a statute similar to North Carolina's
the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "The intent of [the speed exemption
statute] ... is not to hold the patrolman to less than the usual degree or stand-
ard of care. Instead, by its very words the section holds him to 'due regard for
safety' making exception only for the speed at which d patrolman's job sometimes
requires him to travel. The last sentence of this section [the reckless disregard
provision] . . . refers only to the speed exception, and is by its own terms so
limited. It would breach all rules of construction to apply the 'reckless disregard'
standard to any but this speed exception." Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 137, 185
P.2d 304, 309-10 (1947). [Emphasis added.] But cf. Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash.
2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956), where the court said that "if the driver of an emer-
gency vehicle is at all times required to drive with due regard for the safety of
the public as all other drivers are required to do, then all the provisions of
these statutes relating to emergency vehicles become meaningless and no privileges
are granted to them. But if his 'due regard' for the safety of others means that
he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the
right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended." Id. at
661-62, 296 P.2d at 701. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §28-624(d) (1956) ; WAsH.
Rlv. CODE §46.08.050 (1959).2251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The trial court charged that when a police officer is engaged in the
discharge of his duties in an effort to apprehend an offender and the
offender operates his vehicle so as to guard, hinder, and delay the
arrest, the officer would not be liable upon any aspect of negligence
unless his conduct was wilful and wanton or the injuries were inten-
tionally inflicted.3 The jury returned a verdict for the officer on his
counterclaim.
On appeal the court granted the plaintiff a new trial, holding that
the charge was erroneous and stating that "in such situation, an officer
is liable for his negligent acts as well as for his wilful and wanton
acts."4
As to the standard of care required of the officer while in pursuit,
the court quoted two authorities to the effect that the officer is to exer-
cise the care which a reasonable and prudent man would exercise in
the discharge of official duties of a like nature,under like circumstances. 5
The court then stated that "if . .. the defendant was engaged in his
official duties at the time of the collision... mere speed alone, unaccom-
panied by any recklessness or disregard of the rights of others, would
be insufficient to support an allegation of negligence .... ,
Many duties are imposed upon operators of motor vehicles. The
general duty imposed by statute and the law of torts is to drive with
due care. Virtually all jurisdictions have statutory provisions requiring
'It would seem that the trial court was instructing the jury that the plaintiff
may have been contributorily negligent in trying to hinder or delay arrest
in failing to obey the officer's siren, and in failing to yield the right of way. If
the plaintiff had been found contributorily negligent, he would have been barred
from recovery unless the defendant's acts amounted to wanton or intentional
misconduct. Ballew v. Asheville & E. Tenn. R.R., 186 N.C. 704, 120 S.E. 334
(1923) ; Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474, 34 S.E. 634 (1899).
'251 N.C. at 133, 110 S.E.2d at 824. The court stated: "There is no exemption
granted by G.S. 20-145 from reckless and negligent conduct by an officer unless
such reckless and negligent conduct is wilful and wanton, intentional and purpose-
ful, and made for the purpose of injuring the person the officer was seeking to
arrest. In such situation, an officer is liable for his negligent acts as well as
for his wilful and wanton acts." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) This statement is
problematical. If the trial judge was here instructing the jury on the issue of
contributory negligence, the instruction would seem sound. See note 3 supra. If
on the other hand, the trial judge was not instructing on the issue of contributory
negligence, the instruction would seem to be wrong. Apparently, the supreme
court did not consider the former interpretation of the instruction. Even as-
suming the latter interpretation to be correct, the language of the court is not
entirely clear.
'McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958); 60 CJ.S. Motor
Vehicles § 375 (1949).
8 251 N.C. at 133, 110 S.E.2d at 824; accord, Goldstein v. Rogers, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 208 P2d 719 (1949) ; McKay v. -Hargis, supra note 5; La Marra v.
Adam, 164 Pa. Super. 268, 63 A.2d 497 (1949). The court also held that the
evidence of the character of the area in which the collision occurred was sufficient
to require its submission to the jury for its determination as to whether it was
residential. If the jury should so find, "then the plaintiff would be entitled to
have the jury consider the conduct of the defendant in the light of the character
of the area . . . whether he was subject to the ... [speed limit] . . .or G.S.
20-145." 251 N.C. at 131, 110 S.E.2d at 823.
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operators to observe the speed limits, obey stop signs, and yield the
right of way. A violation of these duties may result in negligence. The
speed exemption statute removes the requirement of obeying the speed
limit when an officer is in pursuit of an offender. There is no exemp-
tion for an officer from the duty to maintain a proper lookout, to main-
tain proper control of the vehicle while operating it, or to maintain
the patrol vehicle in proper condition. A violation of these duties
would be a failure to exercise due care or a due regard for safety, and
the officer would be negligent.7 If, however, a speeding officer meets
all of the other duties required of him, then, in order to hold him liable,
his speed must be in reckless disregard of the safety of others. Thus
where speed alone is concerned, it appears from the principal decision
that a different test is to be used in determining whether the officer is
liable.8
Two distinct views have emerged from the decisions as to the offi-
cer's standard of care under speed exemption or right of way statutes.
The precise wording of the statutes varies in each jurisdiction and the
court's construction necessarily depends to some degree upon the
phraseology used.9 The first view is referred to as the Maine rule.10
Court following this rule hold that the exemptions from traffic regula-
tions given to emergency or police vehicles do not relieve their operators
from the duty to exercise due care."' The second view is referred to
as the California rule.12 Courts following this rule hold that the duty
of the officer to use due care is met when he gives adequate warning
of the police vehicle's approach. Liability of the officer may then be
predicated only upon an abuse or arbitrary exercise of the privilege
granted by the speed exemption and right of way statutes.13 Speed
"City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 52 (1951).8 The court in the principal case cited Edberg v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 395, 184
N.W. 12 (1921), -where the court said the conduct of the officer in pursuit of a
lawbreaker is to be examined and tested by another standard. He is required to
observe the care which a reasonable and prudent man would exercise in the
discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances.
'ComPare Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947), with Lakoduk
v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956). These courts construed similar
exemption statutes but reached different results.
"oRussel v. Nadeau, 139 Me. 286, 29 A.2d 916 (1943).
" "They are bound to exercise reasonable precaution against the extraordinary
dangers . . . duty compels them to create. They must keep in mind the speed
at which their vehicle is traveling and the probable consequences of their dis-
regard of traffic [regulations] . . . . The measure of their responsibility is due
care under all circumstances." Id. at 288, 29 A.2d at 917; accord, Ruth v. Rhodes,
66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947) ; Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754
(1959) ; Montalto v. Fond Du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 76 N.W2d 279 (1956).
"
2Lucas v. City of Los Angles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).13 Ibid. The California court indicated that the following would constitute, an
arbitrary exercise of the privilege: (1) emergency operation where there is no
emergency, such as a fire truck returning from a fire or a policeman making
routine runs with no criminal in sight or using the patrol vehicle for personal
use; (2) where the operator sees that another has not heard or heeded the re-
quired warning given by the officer, and the officer persists in speeding or con-
[ Vol. 39
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alone would not constitute an arbitrary exercise of the privilege granted
by such statutes.1 4  It would seem that the courts following the Cali-
fornia "arbitrary exercise" rule require a lesser degree of care on the
part of the officer than those following the Maine "due care" rule. 15
In the Goddard case it appears that the North Carolina court took a
position which incorporated aspects of both the Maine and California
rules. As under the Maine rule, the officer is required to exercise due
care; nevertheless, following the California rule, mere speed alone, un-
less in reckless disregard of the rights of others, will not render the
officer liable.
The North Carolina speed exemption statute applies only when the
officer is operating his vehicle with "due regard for safety."'16 Cali-
fornia17 and Washington' 8 have held that this provision, in their re-
spective statutes,'0 is essentially satisfied when (1) the driver of the
emergency vehicle has by suitable warning given other drivers or
pedestrians an opportunity to yield the right of way and (2) having
discovered the peril in which another has unknowingly or negligently
become involved despite the operation of the required warning devices,
the driver reasonably utilizes any last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent. The Washington court stated that this was the only reasonable
interpretation of the provision, for if the officer "is at all times required
to drive with due regard for the safety of the public as all other drivers
are required to do, then all the provisions of the speed exemption
statute. . . become meaningless and no privileges are granted .... "20
The question arises as to thd North Carolina position on the issue
of what is required of the officer to satisfy the "due regard for safety"
provision of the speed exemption statute.21 It may not be safely as-
tinues through the intersection; (3) when the conduct of the driver of the emer-
gency vehicle is so reckless that it amounts to wilful misconduct. The court
compared the latter, wilful misconduct, as being analogous to the conduct under
which most guest statutes fix liability. Accord, Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash.
2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956) See, CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§21055, 21056;
WAsH. REv. CODE § 46.08.050 (1959). The Washington statute, like North Caro-
lina's, provides that the exemption shall not protect the operator of any emergency
vehicle "from the consequences of a reckless disregard for the safety of others."
Apparently the Washington court considered this provision analogous to the
provision of the California statute which provides that the officer is not pro-
tected from the consequences of abuse or arbitrary exercise of the privilege
granted.1 Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).
",Compare Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 296 P2d 690 (1956), with
Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P2d 754 (1959).
" Thus, operating the vehicle with "due regard for safety" is a condition pre-
cedent to the applicability of the exemption statute, and it would seem that the
speed of an officer who had not satisfied the condition would be negligence Per se.
"' Balthasar v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 202 Pac. 37 (1921); Duff v.
Schaefer Ambulance Serv., 132 Cal. App. 2d 655, 283 .P.2d 91 (1955).
" Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2a 642, 296 P2d 690 (1956).
19CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 21055, 21056; WASH. Rnv. CODE § 46.08.050 (1959).10Lakoduck v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 661-62, 296 P.2d 690, 701 (1956).
" "[T]he speed law exemption is effective. only when the officer operates his
19611
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sumed that once he has given a warning he has satisfied the "due
regard for safety" provision.2 The California court has stated that
failure to sound a siren may be considered a lack of "due regard for
safety." -3 As previously stated, the officer is not exempt from the
duty of keeping a proper lookout, of keeping the patrol vehicle in
proper mechanical condition, or of keeping his car under control. It
would appear that in order to meet the "due regard for safety" pro-
vision the officer must fulfill these duties. 24
The only other case reaching the North Carolina Supreme Court
in which an officer relied upon the speed exemption statute is Glosson
v. Trollinger.25  The officer was pursuing the defendant down a wet,
slippery road at forty to fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile an
hour speed zone when the defendant stopped suddenly and the officer
struck the rear of the defendant's vehicle. In holding that the issue
of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury, the
court emphasized the fact that the defendant had alleged that the officer
was guilty of a "reckless disregard of the rights of others." Apparently
the court in the principal case distinguished the Glosson case on this
basis.26 It would appear that in order to be certain that the complaint
is sufficient to support a finding of liability on the part of the speeding
car 'with due regard to safety' . . . ." Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 133,
110 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1959). Also, by the words of the statute as applied to
police officers, the exemption is effective only when the officer is in pursuit of a
violator of the law or one suspected of a violation. The type or character of the
violation may have some effect upon the court's decision as to whether the
statute is applicable. In Cavey v. City of Bethlehem, 331 Pa. 556, 1 A.2d 653
(1938) (dictum), the court said that clocking a speeding automobile is not such
an emergency duty of the officer as to bring the case within the exemption pro-
vision. The court distinguished Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 563,
195 At. 897 (1938), on the grounds that in that case the officers were in close
pursuit of a fleeing felon who was driving a stolen car. In the principal case,
the plaintiff was being pursued for failure to obey a stop sign. Further, the
defendant testified that he recognized the plaintiff's automobile when it passed
the sign. Record, p. 41. Though the statute makes no distinction as to the
type or character of the violation of which the person pursued is suspected, it
would seem that it should be considered as one of the "circumstances" in deciding
whether the officer is justified in speeding or disregarding other traffic violations.
Some of the things to be considered should be (1) the seriousness of the offense,
(2) the chances for future apprehension, especially where the officer recognizes the
offender, and (3) the character of the area in which the officer is driving.
2 It should be noted that North Carolina's right of way statute does require
the officer to give warning. N.C. GEN. SrAT. §20-156(b) (1953). Once this
warning is given the operator of the emergency vehicle is accorded the statutory
privilege of right of way. He has the right to proceed upon the assumption
that when the signal is given other users of the highway will yield the right of
way. Williams v. Sossoman's Funeral Home, Inc., 248 N.C. 524, 103 S.E.2d 714
(1958). Also, "every motor vehicle operated on the highways of the State by
members of the State Highway Patrol shall be equipped with a siren. Whenever
any such officer or member operating an unmarked car shall overtake another
vehicle on the highway after sunset of any day and before sunrise for the purposes
of stopping the same or apprehending the driver thereof, he shall sound said siren
before stopping such other vehicle." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-190.1 (Supp. 1959).
"2 Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P.2d 1054 (1938).
' City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 52 (1951).
25227 N.C. 84, 40 S.E.2d 606 (1946).
"' The plaintiff in the principal case alleged in his complaint that the officer
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officer, it should allege that the officer was guilty of a "reckless disre-
gard of the safety of others."
The police officer is generally held personally liable to the same
extent as a private individual. 27  In the principal case the suit was
brought against the deputy sheriff alone, and there was no attempt to
join the sheriff or his surety. However, the injured plaintiff may have
different sources of recovery in North Carolina, depending upon the
type officer involved.
If the plaintiff is injured by a state highway patrolman he may be
entitled to bring an action under the Tort Claims Act. 28  The act has
been strictly construed as being applicable to situations where the state
employee, by a negligent act, injures the plaintiff, and it is not clear
whether a person injured by an officer who is speeding in "reckless
disregard" would be able to recover under the act.2 9
Municipal corporations are empowered by G.S. § 160-191.1 to waive
their immunity to suit by purchasing liability insurance.3 0 The court
has considered this statute only twice, and it is not clear whether it
will apply to negligent operation of police vehicles. 3' It would appear
operated his automobile "carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful disregard of the
rights and safety of others ... "Record, p. 4. The same allegation was made
in his reply to the officer's counterclaim, apparently to set up contributory negli-
gence on the part of the officer as a bar to-recovery on the counterclaim. Record,
p. 12. Therefore, it is questionable if the distinction between the principal case
and the Glosson case is a valid one.
"' State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954); Dunn
v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940); 47 Am. JuR. Sheriffs, Police,
and Constables §42 (1943).
" N.C. GaN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300 (1959).
" In Jenkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577
(1956), the patrolman intentionally shot a prisoner and recovery under the Tort
Claims Act was denied, the court holding that the act does not permit recovery
for wrongful and intentional injuries but limits recovery to injuries negligently
inflicted. It has also been held that there can be no recovery for a negligent
omission since the statute refers only to a negligent act. Flynn v. North Carolina
State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
In Lowe v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 353, 93 S.E2d 448 (1956),
a patrolman negligently shot the plaintiff while making an arrest. The court
affirmed recovery under the act although it was argued that pointing a weapon
was an statutory assault. The view stated in RE-STATEmENT, TORTS § 500 (1939)
is that disregard of safety is a higher degree of negligence than ordinary negli-
gence. However, in comment g of the same section it is stated that this difference
of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in 'kind of
misconduct. It would seem that if the court treats acts of an officer which are
in "reckless disregard of the rights of others" as only a higher degree of neg-
ligence, one so injured could recover under the act. On the other hand, if the
court treats such acts as amounting to a different kind of misconduct, analogous
to intentional misconduct, the Tort Claims Act would not be available to one
injured by the "reckless disregard" to the officer.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1 (1952). *The city is authorized but not re-
quired to purchase liability insurance. Immunity is waived only as to the amount
of insurance obtained. Once liability insurance is obtained, in the absence of
affirmative action by the city's governing body, the immunity is deemed waived.
The statute is silent as to what type of "affirmative action" is necessary in order
to deny waiver of immunity once the insurance is obtained.
" In Moore v. Town of Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d 695 (1959), the
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that the legislature so intended since the statute is directed to the "neg-
ligent operation of any motor vehicle" by a municipal employee during
the course and scope of his emplbyment.3 2
By G.S. § 153-9(44) any board of county commissioners is em-
powered to secure liability insurance and thereby waive the county's
immunity to suit.33 This statute is directed to any tort claim arising
from the negligence of county employees ;34 it would seem, by implica-
tion, that it would apply to claims arising from the negligent operation
of police vehicles.35
According to the provisions of G.S. § 109-34 every person injured
by the neglect or misconduct of a sheriff is given a right of action
against the sheriff and his surety upon the official bond. 0 In addition,
a sheriff is held liable for the wrongful acts of his deputy, committed
under the color of office, his liability being governed 'by the law appli-
cable to principal and agent.37 While the court has not construed G.S.
§ 109-34 in a case involving the negligent operation of a patrol vehicle
by a sheriff or his deputy, it would seem that this provision would
enable one to sue the surety for damages incurred in such a manner.38
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city was held liable for damages resulting from a collision caused by the negligent
operation of a truck being used by the city for pest control. In Clark v. Scheld,
253 N.C. 732, 117 S.E2d 838 (1961), the city of Lenoir was held not to be
liable for damages incurred in an accident similar to that involved in the Moore
case because there was no showing the city had secured liability insurance.
2The city charter should be examined prior to instituting the action against
the city. Charters usually provide for certain prerequisites which must be met
before bringing suit. The most common of these is the requirement of sufficient
notice of the claim to the city's governing body within a prescribed time. In
Carter v. City of Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959), the court
said failure to give the city notice of a claim within the time prescribed by its
charter would ordinarily result in a nonsuit unless the plaintiff alleges and
proves justification for the delay of notice and did actually give the city notice
within a reasonable time after the disability was removed.
"'N.C., GEN. STAT. § 153-9(44) (Supp. 1959).
" In Walker v. County of Randolph, 251 N.C. 805, 112 S.E.2d 551 (1960),
the county was sued for the negligent maintenance of its court house.
" It should be noted that the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsi-
bility Act of 1953 does not apply to any motor vehicle owned by the state, to its
operator, nor to the operator of a vehicle owned by a political subdivision of the
state, provided the political subdivision has waived immunity. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 20-279.32 (Supp. 1959).
" The sheriff is required to execute an official bond payable to the state to
insure the faithful execution of his office. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-8 (1952). In
Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 4 S.E.2d 611 (1939), the court held the surety
liable when the sheriff used excessive force in making a wrongful arrest. In
Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940), the sheriff and his surety
were held liable for the wrongful death of a prisoner which was caused by the
negligence of a jailor.
" Cain v. Corbett, 235 N.C. 33, 69 S.E2d 20 (1952); Dunn v. Swanson,
supra note 36.
" In Cain v. Corbett, supra note 37, the court held that the sheriff, his surety
on the official bond, the deputy, and the deputy's surety were properly joined as
defendants in an action for false arrest which was made by the deputy.
(Vol. 39
